SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Bruce 1354 R

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 16,1952

SUBJECT: TRIESTE

PARTICIPANTS: Signor Alberto Tarchiani, Ambassador, Italian Embassy.
Mr. David Bruce - U, Acting Secretary
Mr. V. L. Collins, Jr. - WE

COPIES TO: S/S (2)
WE
EE
EUR (2)
American Embassy, Rome

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY CEC DATE 7-1-81
XD or XDS EXT. DATE
TS AUTH.
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS
DECLASSIFY
RELEASE DENIED
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—61120-1

The Italian Ambassador called at his request at 11:00 o'clock, October 16, and spent a half hour giving me the most recent views of his Government on the Trieste situation.

The Ambassador began by noting that he had just returned from Italy and that Italy seemed this summer to be in better shape than it had at any time since the war. He said that the Government parties were confident that the people of Italy recognized that the material progress had been made under their administration and that, were it not for the Trieste question, there would be no doubt as to the outcome of the forthcoming elections. However, the non-solution of the Trieste problem, a patriotic issue more than a material one, puts the Government in a vulnerable position. The Ambassador pointed out that Parliament was beginning a discussion of Trieste and that the first order of business after this would be the passage of the electoral law which he thought the Government parties could carry without any trouble. I asked him, at this point, whether EDC ratification would come next and he said that while the Government favored EDC ratification he was unable to say when the Parliament would be ready to go ahead because of the Trieste problem.

The Ambassador then went on to point out how every succeeding line drawn up as a border between Italy and Yugoslavia cut further into Italy, that the frontiers of the Free Territory represented the greatest concession which the Italians had ever been asked to make so far as an Italian ethnic line was concerned. Despite this and despite the fact that the March 20 1948 Declaration reaffirmed the fundamental Italian character of the Free Territory, Italy had negotiated with the Yugoslavs and had made propositions to the Yugoslavs involving

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

involving further concessions by Italy from the March 20 Declaration. The Ambassador noted that all of these negotiations had been in vain; that Marshal Tito did not want to settle the problem on any terms which an Italian Government could accept. He added that Mr. Eden's negotiations had in fact caused a retrogression and had harmed rather than helped the possibility of solution and he concluded by saying that the U.S. and the U.S. alone could bring about a solution of the Trieste problem. The Ambassador clarified this by urging that the U.S. should draw up a line on an ethnic basis and present it to both parties as a solution of the problem. He made it fairly clear that the Italians would be able to accept any such line which included Capodistria, Isola, and Pirano and he implied equally clearly that Italy rejected the Eden solution.

He left with me a memorandum explaining the background and the reasons for the memorandum of October 10. I told him that we were studying the October 10 memorandum and would inform him as soon as we came to any conclusions.

David Bruce

Attachment:
Memorandum No. 12560
from Italian Embassy.

EUR:WE:VLCollins,Jr:jc

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY CEC DATE 7-1-81

FDC☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDOR EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLA FIED☑ RELEASABLE☑
RELEA DENIED☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

DECLASSIFIED